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1. Introduction 
In an extensive form game, the moments in time at which players have to make 
decisions are modeled by so-called decision nodes. At a given decision node, the 
corresponding player can base his decision only on the information available to 
him in that node. The collection of decision nodes between which the player can 
not distinguish a-priori is called an information set. Hence, the player can deduce 
from his information that he is in one of the nodes in this set, but he can make 
no further distinction between these nodes. 
In this paper we analyze the situation in which each player delegates the decision 
making at his information sets to a number of representatives which are called his 
agents. In effect, this means that the original extensive form game is transformed 
into a new game in which the player set equals the set of agents. Such a trans-
formation is called a player splitting. As an extreme example, every player could 
decide to assign each of his information sets to a different agent, transforming the 
game into its agent normal form. However, we allow for a more general setting 
in which it is possible to assign several information sets to the same agent. The 
aim of the paper is to study different types of player splittings and check to what 
extent various solution concepts are robust against these player splittings. 
In most literature, attention is restricted to independent player splittings in which 
in every play of the game at most one agent of every player appears. Intuitively, 
by applying an independent player splitting a player only loses the capability to 
coordinate his actions in different branches of the game tree. However, once the 
play has reached one branch of the game tree, what happens in other branches 
is irrelevant. For this reason, robustness against independent player splittings 
seems to be an appealing property for a solution concept, as Mertens (1989) al-
ready indicated. This type of robustness is formalized in the well-known player 
splitting property (Mertens, 1989). We verify this property for a number of solu-
tion concepts. 
Next, we make the step to dependent player splittings in which in a certain play 
of the game two agents of the same player appear. It seems logical that under 
a dependent player splitting, the loss of capability to coordinate actions in the 
same branch of the game tree highly restricts the strategic abilities of a player. 
This intuition is supported by the fact that all solution concepts considered in 
this paper are sensitive to dependent player splittings. 
The paper is organized as follows. In sections 2 and 3 we present some prelimi-
naries and a formal definition of the player splitting property. Further, we discuss 
some useful technical results on independent player splittings. 
In section 4 we prove that Nash equilibria, perfect equilibria, Kohlberg-Mertens 
stable sets and Mertens stable sets satisfy the player splitting property. In an 
example, it is shown that the proper equilibrium concept does not satisfy the 
player splitting property. However, proper equilibria are shown to satisfy a weaker 
version of the player splitting property which is called the weak player splitting 
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property. 
Section 5 covers the technical details connected with the analysis of dependent 
player splittings. Although the basic idea of invariance of a solution concept 
under a general player splitting -the solution of a game should not change when 
this player splitting is applied- seems quite straightforward, a sound ·definition 
requires an answer to a number of technical questions. As to assure that this 
new, general definition is an extension of the player splitting property we show 
that the definition coincides with the player splitting property when applying to 
the class of independent player splittings. 
In section 6 we show that none of the solution concepts mentioned above is 
invariant under any dependent player splitting. These results are in accordance 
with the intuition that dependent player splittings, in contrast to independent 
player splittings, really do change the strategic abilities of the players. 
This insight is used in section 7 to give several characterizations of the class of 
independent player splittings. It turns out to be the largest class of player split-
tings under which Nash equilibria, perfect equilibria, Kohlberg-Mertens stable 
sets and Mertens stable sets are invariant. Furthermore, it is the largest class of 
player splittings under which the proper equilibrium concept is weakly invariant. 
Finally in this section, we consider the class of single appearance games in which 
every player appears at most once in every play of the game. Using previous 
results, we give several characterizations of this class by means of the invariance 
of solutions under player splittings. 
2. Preliminaries 
In an extensive form game, the graphical structure of the game consisting of the 
game tree, the information sets, the actions, the chance moves and the player 
labels is called the extensive form structure. We denote the set of players by 
N. The information sets are denoted by h, whereas H is the collection of all 
information sets. At an information set h, A( h) is the set of actions available at 
h. We assume that IA(h) I 2: 2 for all h. The set of terminal nodes is denoted by Z. 
The payoff for player i at a terminal node z is given by Ui(Z). An extensive form 
game with extensive form structure Sand payoffs u is denoted as r = (S, u) . 
Often, we write game instead of extensive form game and structure instead of 
extensive form structure. 
In an extensive form game, a pure strategy for player i is a function mi assigning to 
each information set hE Hi an action in A(h). The set of player i pure strategies 
will be denoted by Mi. For a pure strategy profile m = (ml, ... , m n ), vi(m) is the 
payoff to player i when m is played. 
The normal form game rN = (M, v), where M := 11 Mi and v := (VI, ... , vn ) is 
called the normal form of r. 
A mixed strategy for player i is a probability distribution Pi on M i . For a mixed 
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strategy profile p = (PI, ... ,Pn), ]pp denotes the probability distribution on the 
terminal nodes generated by P and Vi(P) is the (expected) payoff to player i 
induced by p. 
For a mixed strategy profile p and a mixed strategy p~, the mixed strategy profile 
in which player i plays according to p~ and all other players play according to p 
is denoted by p\p~. 
Since the set of mixed strategies profiles depends only on the extensive form 
structure S, we sometimes talk about mixed strategies in S instead of mixed 
strategies in r. 
Player splitting property 
Consider an extensive form structure S. A player splitting on S is a mechanism 
which divides the information sets of each player between so-called agents. For-
mally, a player splitting on S is a function 7r which defines for every player i a 
partition {Hij I j E J( i)} of the collection Hi of information sets controlled by 
player i. 
The player splitting 7r induces a new extensive form structure S1r in which the 
player set is given by N' = {ij liE N,j E J(i)} and every player ij controls the 
information sets in Hij. The players ij are called agents of player i. 
For every extensive form game r with structure S, 7r induces a new game r 1r with 
structure S1r and payoffs Uij(Z) given by Uij(Z) := Ui(Z) for every terminal node 
z. 
In S1r, pure strategies are usually denoted by mij and the set of pure strategies 
of agent ij is given by M ij . We use qij and q to represent mixed strategies and 
mixed strategy profiles in S1r repectively. 
A player splitting on S is called independent if on every path in the game tree, 
at most one agent of every player is present. 
As is argued by Mertens (1989), independent player splittings do not really change 
the strategic abilities of the players. Therefore, it is considered a desirable prop-
erty for a solution to be robust against independent player splittings: a prop-
erty which is known as the player splitting property and has been introduced by 
Mertens (1989). In order to recall the definition of the player splitting property, 
we need some more definitions. 
Let 7r be an independent player splitting on S. By f1r, we denote the function 
which assigns to every mixed strategy profile p in S the mixed strategy profile 
q = (qij )iEN,jEJ( i) in S1r given by 
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for every i E N, j E J(i) and every mij E M ij . Here, (mi)ij denotes the restriction 
of mi on the information sets in Hij . 
The function f1l: transforms every mixed strategy Pi of 5 into an equivalent col-
lection (qij )jEJ(i) of mixed strategies of 511:. The word equivalent means that in 
every mixed strategy profile q' of 511: in which player i plays (qij) jEJ(i) , we can 
replace (qij )jEJ(i) by Pi without changing the probabilities on the terminal nodes. 
Throughout this paper, we say that p generates q. 
Note that the function r also does its work for games without perfect recall. This 
is the reason that we do not require perfect recall when working with independent 
player splittings. Later on, when studying dependent player splittings, perfect 
recall is needed, however. 
Two extensive form games f = (5, u) and f' = (5, u') are called equivalent if 
Ui(Z) = u~(z) whenever player i appears on the path to z. Intuitively, this means 
that, whenever a player has to move, the payoffs for this player are the same in 
the remainder of the games f and f'. 
Let r.p be a solution assigning to every extensive form game a collection of sets 
of mixed strategy profiles. We say that the solution r.p has the player splitting 
property if for every extensive form game f, every independent player splitting 1f 
on the structure of f and every game f' which is equivalent to f1l: we have that 
r.p(f') = {r (S) I S E r.p(r)} (2.1) 
and for every T E r.p(f') it holds that 
U {S E r.p(r) I r(S) = T } = (r)-l(T). (2.2) 
Here, Sand T denote sets of mixed strategy profiles. In words, condition (2.1) 
means that the solution sets in f' are exactly the images under r of the solution 
sets in f, whereas condition (2.2) states that the inverse image of a solution set 
Tin f' is the union of solution sets in f which are mapped onto T. 
In the case where r.p is a point valued solution, the two conditions are equivalent 
to 
We say that r.p satisfies the weak player splitting property if it holds that 
{f7r(S) I SE r.p(f)} c r.p(f'). 
Intuitively, this means that r transforms solution sets in f into solution sets in 
f'. 
The definition of the player splitting property is illustrated by the following dia-
gram. 
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3. Technical properties of independent player splittings 
Independent player splittings have the special property that in the resulting game 
every path crosses at most one agent of every player. In this section, we show that 
this leads to some very special relationships between the expected payoffs of the 
original game and the expected payoffs of the new game. Since these results are 
used repeatedly in section 4, we dedicate a separate section to these relationships. 
Throughout this section, let 7f be an independent player splitting on an extensive 
form structure 5, r = (5, u) an extensive form game with structure 5 and [' = 
(51r , u/) a game which is equivalent to [1T. Let p be a mixed strategy profile in r 
and q a mixed strategy profile in [' generated by p. The expected payoffs in [ 
and [' are denoted by Vi(P) , Vij(q) and V~j(q) respectively, whereas the payoffs at 
the terminal nodes are given by Ui(Z),Uij(Z) and U~j(z) respectively. 
For a collection H' of information sets, Z(H') denotes the set of terminal nodes 
which follow H'. Since 7f is independent, Z(Hi) is the disjoint union of the sets 
Z(Hij). Hence, for every mixed strategy profile q in [' and every agent ij, 
V~j(q) = LlPq(z) U~j(z) = L lPq(z) Ui(Z)+ L lPq(z) U~j(z), (3.1) 
zEZ zEZ(Hij) zrtZ(Hij) 
where the second equality follows from the fact that U~j(z) = Ui(Z) for all Z E 
Z(Hij). This relation plays an important role as well as the following lemma. 
Lemma 3.1. (a) If 
V~j(q\mij) < V~j(q\lij), 
then for all pure strategies mi and li of player i with (mi)ij = mij, (li)ij = lij 
and mi(h) = li(h) for all hE Hi\Hij it holds that 
vi(P\mi) < vi(P\li). 
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(b) If 
then there is an agent ij with pure strategies mij = (mi)ij and lij = (li)ij such 
that 
Proof. (a) Suppose that v~j(q\mij) < v~j(q\lij). Let mi and li be pure strategies 
of player i with (mi)ij = mij, (li)ij = lij and mi(h) = li(h) if hE Hi\Hij. Then, 
we have 
Vi (p\mi) Vij (q\mi) = L JP>q\mi (Z) Ui(Z) + L JP>q\mi (z) Ui(Z) 
zEZ(Hij) Zrt:Z(Hij) 
L JP>q\mij (Z) U~j(Z) + L JP>q\mi (z) Ui(Z) 
zEZ(Hij) Zrt:Z(Hij) 
V~j(q\mij) - L JP>q\mij(Z)U~j(Z) + L JP>q\mi(Z)Ui(Z) 
Zrt:Z(Hij) Zrt:Z(Hij) 
< V~j(q\lij) - L JP>q\li/Z) U~j(Z) + L JP>q\li(Z) Ui(Z) 
Zrt:Z(Hij) Zrt:Z(Hij) 
Here, the inequality follows from the fact that (1) v~j(q\mij) < v~j(q\lij) and (2) 
JP>q\mij(z) = JP>q\lij(Z) and JP>q\mi(z) = JP>q\li(Z) for Z rt. Z(Hij). The last equality is 
obtained if we substitute mi by li in the first three equations. 
(b) Suppose that vi(p\mi) < vi(p\li). For a terminal node Z rt. Z(Hi), JP>q(z) does 
not depend on player i's strategy. Hence, for such a Z and any pure strategy ri 
of player i it holds that JP>q\ri(z) = JP>q(z) leading to 
Vi(p\ri) = L L JP>q\rJz) Ui(Z) + L JP>q(z) Ui(Z). 
jEJ(i) zEZ(Hij) Zrt:Z(Hi) 
L L JP>q\mi(z)Ui(Z) < L L 1Pq\li(Z)Ui(Z). 
jEJ(i) zEZ(Hij) jEJ(i) zEZ(Hij) 
So we can find an agent ij such that 
L JP>q\mi(z) Ui(Z) < L JP>q\t;Cz) Ui(Z). 
zEZ(Hij ) zEZ(Hij) 
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V~j(q\mij) = L lP'q\mij (Z) Ui(Z) + L lP'q\m'(z) U~j(z) 
zEZ(Hij ) z!/:-Z(Hij) 
L lP'q\mi (Z) Ui(Z) + L lP'q(z) U~j(z) 
zEZ(Hij ) z!/:-Z(Hij ) 
< L JP>q\li (Z) Ui(Z) + L JP>q(z) U~j(z) 
zEZ(Hij) Z!/:-Z(Hij) 
V~j (q \ lij ) . 
o 
4. Behavior of solutions under independent player splittings 
In this section, we investigate how Nash equilibria, perfect equilibria, proper 
equilibria, Kohlberg-Mertens stable sets and Mertens stable sets behave under 
independent player splittings. It turns out that all solution concepts listed above, 
except the proper equilibria, satisfy the player splitting property. 
4.1. Nash equilibria 
The correspondence which assigns to every extensive form game r the set of Nash 
equilibria (Nash, 1950) of the normal form is denoted by NE. 
Theorem 4.1. The Nash equilibrium concept satisfies the player splitting prop-
erty. 
Proof. Let f be an extensive form game, 7r an independent player splitting on 
the structure of f and f' a game which is equivalent to pr. The expected payoffs 
in f, f7l" and f' are denoted by Vi(P), Vij(q) and V~j(q) respectively. We show that 
(r)-l(NE(f')) = NE(f). 
(a) First we prove that NE(f) c (f7l")-l(NE(f')). 
Let P E NE(f) and let q = r(p). We prove that q E NE(f'). 
Let mij, lij E Hij and qij (mij) > O. We can choose mi, li with (mi)ij = mij, (li)ij = 
lij and mi(h) = li(h) for all h E Hi\Hij . Since p is a Nash equilibrium and 
Pi(mi) > 0 we have vi(p\mi) 2': vi(p\li). By Lemma 3.1 (a), it follows that 
v~j(q\mij) 2': V~j(q\lij). Since this holds for all such mij, lij we may conclude that 
q is a Nash equilibrium in r'. 
(b) Now, we show that (f7l")-l(NE(f')) C NE(f). 
Let p E (r)-l(NE(r')) and q = r(p). So, by construction, q E NE(f'). We 
prove that pEN E(f). Let mi, li E Mi be such that vi(p\mi) < vi(p\li). Then, 
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by Lemma 3.1 (b), there is an agent ij with pure strategies mij = (mi)ij and 
lij = (li)ij such that v~j(q\mij) < V~j(q\lij). Since q is a Nash equilibrium in r', 
it follows that % (mij) = O. Therefore, 
which implies that Pi(mi) = O. Since this holds for every such mi, it follows that 
P is a Nash equilibrium in r. 0 
4.2. Perfect equilibria 
In this paper, we exploit the following characterization of perfect equilibria (Sel-
ten, 1975) for normal form games. 
A mixed strategy profile P is a perfect equilibrium in a normal form game if and 
only if there is a sequence (pk)kEN of completely mixed mixed strategy profiles 
converging to p such that vi(pk\mi) < Vi(pk\li) for some k implies Pi(mi) = O. 
By completely mixed, we mean that every pure strategy is played with strictly 
positive probability. By PE, we denote the correspondence which assigns to ev-
ery extensive form game the set of perfect equilibria of the normal form. This 
correspondence is therefore different from the original definition of perfect equi-
libria for extensive form games, which makes use of the agent normal form and is 
given in terms of behavior strategy profiles. Whenever we speak about a perfect 
equilibrium of the extensive form game r, we mean a perfect equilibrium of the 
normal form of r. 
Before we come to the main result we need two technical lemmas. The first lemma 
can be found in Cook et al. (1986). 
Lemma 4.2. Let A be a real m x n matrix, B := {b I Ax :s: b is solvable} and 
'I/J(b) := {x I Ax :s: b} for every bE B. Then, there is an L > 0 such that 
for every b, b' E B. 
Here, dB denotes the Hausdorff-distance and 11·11 represents the maximum norm. 
Lemma 4.3. Let S be an extensive form structure and 7r an independent player 
splitting on S. Moreover, let p be a mixed strategy profile in S, q = r (P) and 
qk a sequence of completely mixed mixed strategy profiles in STr converging to 
q. Then, there is a sequence pk of completely mixed mixed strategy profiles in S 
converging to p with r(pk) = qk for every k. 
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Proof. Let M(5) and M(5 7r ) be the sets of mixed strategy profiles in 5 and 
5 7r respectively. Since the function f" : M(5) ---t M(5 7r ) is linear and surjective 
and the set M (5) is determined by linear equalities and inequalities, there is a 
matrix A and an affine function b on M(5 7r ) such that 
So, by Lemma 4.2, we can find a constant L> 0 such that 
for all q, q'. Therefore, since b( q) is affine, there is an L' > 0 with 
for all q,q'. Now, let p be a mixed strategy profile in 5, q = f"(p) and qk a 
sequence of completely mixed mixed strategy profiles in 5 7r converging to q. By 
the inequality above we can find a sequence pk E (f7r)-l(qk) converging to p. 
For every k, let pk be the mixed strategy profile in 5 given by 
pf(mi) = IT qt((mi)ij) 
ijEJ(i) 
for all i E Nand mi E M i . Obviously, pk is completely mixed for every k. For 
each k we define pk by 
pk = (1- ~)pk + ~pk. k k 
Since f"(pk) = qk and f7r(pk) = qk, it follows by linearity of f7r that f7r(pk) = qk. 
The observation that pk converges to p and pk is completely mixed completes the 
proof. 0 
Theorem 4.4. The perfect equilibrium concept satisfies the player splitting prop-
erty. 
Proof. Let r be an extensive form game, 1f an independent player splitting on 
the structure of rand r' a game which is equivalent to r7r. The expected payoffs 
in f,f7r and f' are denoted by Vi(p),Vij(q) and V~j(q) respectively. 
(a) First we show that (f7r)-l(PE(f')) C PE(f). 
Suppose that p E (f")-l(PE(f')), which means that q = !"(p) is a perfect 
equilibrium in f'. Then there is a sequence qk of completely mixed mixed strategy 
profiles converging to q such that qij(mij) = 0 if V~j(qk\mij) < V~j(qk\lij). By 
Lemma 4.3 there is a sequence pk of completely mixed mixed strategy profiles in 
f converging to p with!" (pk) = qk. 
In order to show that p is perfect, we suppose that vi(pk\mi) < vi(pk\li) for pure 
strategies mi and li of player i. By Lemma 3.1 (b) there is an agent ij with pure 
10 
I 11 
strategies mij = (mi)ij and lij = (li)ij such that v~j(l\mij) < V~j(qk\lij). This 
implies that % (mij) = O. Since 
it follows that Pi(ri) = 0 for all ri with h)ij = mij. In particular, Pi(mi) = 0, 
which implies that P is a perfect equilibrium for the game r. 
(b) Next, we show that PE(r) c (f7r)-l(PE(r')). 
Let pEP E(r). So there is a sequence pk of completely mixed mixed strategy 
profiles converging to p such that Pi(mi) = 0 if Vi (pk\mi) < Vi(pk\li). We prove 
that q = r(p) is a perfect equilibrium in r'. If qk is the mixed strategy profile in 
r' generated by pk, then qk is completely mixed and the sequence qk converges 
to q. 
In order to show that q is perfect, we suppose that V~j(qk\mij) < V~j(qk\lij). Let 
mi,li be pure strategies with (mi)ij = mij, (li)ij = lij and mi(h) = li(h) for all 
h E Hi\Hij. Then, by Lemma 3.1 (a), vi(pk\mi) < Vi(pk\li) which implies that 
Pi(mi) = O. Since this holds for every pure strategy mi with (mi)ij = mij it 
follows that 
Hence q is a perfect equilibrium for the game r'. o 
4.3. Proper equilibria 
A mixed strategy profile p is called c- proper in a normal form game for some 
c > 0 if it is completely mixed and vi(P\mi) < vi(P\li) implies Pi(mi) :::; c Pi(li). 
We call p a proper equilibrium (Myerson, 1978) if there is a sequence (ck)kEN of 
strictly positive numbers converging to zero and a sequence (pk)kEN of ck-proper 
mixed strategy profiles converging to p. The correspondence which assigns to 
every extensive form game the set of proper equilibria of the normal form is 
called PR. 
Remark 1. The proper equilibrium concept does not satisfy the player splitting 
property. 
Proof. Consider the signaling game r below which is taken from Cho and Kreps 
(1987), pp. 200-201. Let 7r be the independent player splitting which divides the 
information sets of player 1 among the agents la and 1 b respectively. 
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First we prove that q = (a; C; e) is a proper equilibrium in r7r. For c > ° sufficiently 
small 
qC: = ((1 - c2 )a + c2b; (1 - c2)c + c2d; (1 - c2)e + c21) 
is c-proper for the game r7r. Since limdO qC: = q it follows that q is a proper 
equilibrium in r7r. 
Next, we show that the unique mixed strategy profile p = (ac; e) in r which 
induces q is not a proper equilibrium in r. The normal form of r is given by 
e f 
ac 0,0 0,0 
ad -0.9,0.9 -0.9,0 
bc -0.1,0 0.1,0.1 
bd -1,0.9 -0.8,0.1 
Assume that p is a proper equilibrium for the game r. Then, for c > ° small 
enough there is an c-proper profile V = (Pi, p~) in r with limdO pC: = p. If p~ is 
close to e then ad and bd are both worse responses than bc. Hence, ad and bd 
are played with a very small probability compared to bc. But then, e is a worse 
response than f implying that e should be played with probability zero in p. This 
is a contradiction. Therefore, p is not a proper equilibrium in r implying that the 
proper equilibrium correspondence does not satisfy the player splitting property. 
o 
However, we can show that the proper equilibria correspondence satisfies the weak 
player splitting property. In order to prove this, we need the following lemma. In 
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this lemma, let r be an extensive form game, 7r an independent player splitting 
on the structure of rand r
' 
a game which is equivalent to r1l". 
Lemma 4.5. Ifp is E-proper in r, then r(p) is E-proper in r'. 
Proof. Let E > 0 and P an E-proper mixed strategy profile for the game r. Then, 
obviously, the mixed strategy profile q = r (p) is completely mixed since P is 
completely mixed. In order to show that q is E-proper for the game r', we prove 
that %(mij) ::; E%(lij) if v~j(q\mij) < v~j(q\lij). 
So suppose that v~j(q\mij) < V:j(q\lij). Then by Lemma 3.1 (a), vi(p\mi) < 
Vi(p\li) for all pure strategies mi and li with (mi)ij = mij, (li)ij = lij and 
mi(h) = li(h) for all h E Hi\Hij. Since P is an E-proper mixed strategy profile 
for the game r, Pi (mi) ::; E Pi (li) for all such pairs mi, li. 
For every pure strategy mi with (mi)ij = mij we can find a corresponding pure 
strategy mi \lij which prescribes lij at Hij and coincides with mi at Hi \Hij . Since 
Pi ( mi) ::; E Pi (mi \ lij) for such mi we have 
%(mij) = L Pi(mi) ::; L EPi(mi\lij) 
mi: (mi)ij=mij mi: (mi)ij=mij 
= L EPi(li) = E%(lij). 
li:(li)ij=lij 
Since this holds for every mij and lij with v~j(q\mij) < v:j(q\lij), it follows that 
q is E-proper in the game r'. 0 
This result immediately implies the following theorem. 
Theorem 4.6. The proper equilibria concept satisfies the weak player splitting 
property. 
4.4. Stable sets 
Stable sets 
In a normal form game r, a set S of mixed strategy profiles is called a Kohlberg-
Mertens stable set (KM-stable set) (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986) if it is minimal 
with respect to the following property: S is closed and for every open set 0 
containing S there is an E > 0 such that for every strictly positive mistake vector 
TJ = (TJj(mj))jEN,mjEMj ::; E we have 
Here, [17 is the restriction of the game r to mixed strategies Pj with Pj (mj) ~ 
TJj (mj) for all j and all mj E Mj. The game [17 is called a perturbed game. 
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Let KM be the correspondence which assigns to every extensive form game the 
collection of KM-stable sets of the normal form. In order to prove the following 
theorem, we need the definition of invariant solutions which can be found in 
Mertens (1987), Theorem 2 (b). 1 
A normal form solution c.p is called invariant if for every two games f, f* with 
the same player set and every linear, payoff preserving function f mapping the 
strategy space of f onto the strategy space of f* we have 
c.p(f*) = {J(5) 15 E c.p(f)} 
and for every T E c.p(f*) it holds that 
U {5 E <per) I f(5) = T } = f-l(T). 
( 4.1) 
(4.2) 
Theorem 4.7. The KM-stability concept satisfies the player splitting property. 
Proof. Let f be an extensive form game, 7r an independent player splitting 
on the structure of f and f' a game which is equivalent to f7r. Let r* be the 
normal form game with the same player set as f in which the strategy space of 
player i is the product of the mixed strategy spaces of the corresponding agents 
ij. Let f be the payoff preserving, linear function from the strategy space of f 
onto the strategy space of f* which is obtained by taking the marginals. Since 
it is shown in Mertens (1987), section 4.2.5 that KM is invariant, it follows that 
the Kohlberg-Mertens stable sets of f and f* satisfy equations (4.1) and (4.2). 
It remains to show that the KM-stable sets of f* and f' are the same. However, 
this follows from the fact that the perturbed games of f* and f' are the same as 
is shown in Mertens (1989), proof of Theorem 4. Consequently, the KM-stable 
sets of f and f' satisfy equations (2.1) and (2.2). 0 
In 1989, Mertens introduced a new stability concept called Menens stable sets. 
Since it would require too much space to give an exact description of Mertens 
stable sets we refer to Mertens (1989) for a precise definition. Mertens (1989) 
showed that the Mertens stability concept has the player splitting property. 
5. Invariance under general player splittings 
The player splitting property can be viewed as a tool which is used to investigate 
the behavior of solutions under independent player splittings. Among the solution 
concepts considered, all but one are robust against independent player splittings. 
This result supports the idea, stated by Mertens (1989), that independent player 
splittings do not really change the strategic abilities of the players. On the other 
hand, Mertens argues that dependent player splittings do change the strategic 
situation of the game. A natural question which arises is whether this statement 
I Mertens did not use the word invariance in this paper. 
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can be supported by the behavior of solution concepts under dependent player 
splittings. 
In order to answer this question, we introduce a definition of invariance of solu-
tions under player splittings. This definition mainly follows the idea of the player 
splitting property: the solutions should not change by applying the player split-
ting. In the next section, we show that none of the solution concepts above is 
invariant under any dependent player splitting. Consequently, the class of inde-
pendent player splittings can be regarded as the largest class of player splittings 
leaving the strategic situation of the game unchanged. 
Technical problems 
However, there are two major technical problems which complicates our attempt 
to give a suitable definition of invariance under player splittings. In order to 
compare the solutions of the original game r and the new game r' we need 
a surjective function which maps every mixed strategy in r to an equivalent 
collection of mixed strategies in r'. The first problem is due to the fact that, in 
contrast with independent player splittings, we are not able to construct such a 
surjective function if the player splitting is dependent, except for some special 
cases. If, for instance, the player splitting is maximal, meaning that it assigns 
each information set to a different agent, we can apply the function used in 
Kuhn (1953) which transforms every mixed strategy into a equivalent collection 
of behavior strategies. For this construction, however, we need the assumption 
that the game has perfect recall (see Kuhn, 1953). Unfortunately, we are not able 
to generalize Kuhn's transformation if the player splitting is dependent and not 
maximal, as is the case in the following example. 
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la 
1b 
la 
la 
Figure 2 
Here, the information sets all belong to player 1 in the original game and are 
distributed among the agents la and 1b under the player splitting. It is not clear 
how we should construct a surjective function mapping mixed strategies of the 
original game to equivalent collections of mixed strategies of the new game. 
In order to overcome this difficulty, we tried to define invariance under player 
splittings in such a way that the solutions should not change under every such 
surjective function, without stating explicitly how these functions should look 
like. Unfortunately, this gives rise to a second problem. 
If we restrict ourselves to independent player splittings, there is in general more 
than one way to construct this surjective function. Consider, for example, the 
following game. 
e 
1 
d 
a 
1 
Figure 3 
Let 7r be the trivial player splitting which leaves the extensive form structure the 
same. Then, one could choose a function f which transforms the mixed strategy be 
into the equivalent mixed strategy bd. However, this function is different from the 
function r in the definition of the player splitting property. As a consequence, 
the property that the solution should not change under every independent player 
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splitting and every surjective function mapping mixed strategies into equivalent 
ones is in general strictly stronger than the player splitting property, since the 
latter only requires that the solutions should not change under one such surjective 
function, namely the function f7r. Since we want invariance under independent 
player splittings to be equivalent to the player splitting property, we put an extra 
restriction on the class of surjective functions f which can be applied. This extra 
restriction says that the function f should transform mixed strategies not only 
into equivalent but into perfectly equivalent collections of mixed strategies, a term 
which is defined below. The extra restriction guarantees that the only function 
which can be chosen at independent player splittings is the function r. As a 
consequence, a solution is invariant under all independent player splittings if and 
only if it satisfies the player splitting property. Therefore, invariance under player 
splittings is an extension of the player splitting property. 
Definition of invariance under player splittings 
Let S be an extensive form structure and 7r a player splitting on S. A mixed 
strategy Pi in S is said to be perfectly equivalent to a collection (qij)jEJ(i) of 
mixed strategies in S7r if there is a sequence (Pf)kEN of completely mixed strategies 
converging to Pi and a sequence ((qt)jEJ(i»)kEN converging to (qij)jEJ(i) such that 
pf is equivalent to (qt)jEJ(i) for every k. 
In words, this means that by perturbing Pi a bit, we can always find an equivalent 
collection of mixed strategies in the neighborhood of (qij)jEJ(i)' Obviously, perfect 
equivalence always implies equivalence. In the example of figure 3, bc is equivalent 
to bd but they are not perfectly equivalent. 
Suppose that the player splitting 7r is dependent, assigning two player i infor-
mation sets h and h' on the same path to two different agents. Assume that h' 
comes after h. In order to obtain equivalence between mixed player i strategies 
in S and mixed player i strategies in S7r it should hold that player i does not 
loose information when going from h to h': something that is guaranteed if the 
game has perfect recall. Otherwise, there exist mixed strategies in S which have 
no equivalent collection of mixed strategies in S7r. The argument for this is the 
same as Kuhn's argument stating that every mixed strategy has an equivalent 
collection of behavior strategies only if the game has perfect recall. For this rea-
son, we assume from now on that all games considered have perfect recall. In the 
section on independent player splittings we did not need perfect recall since the 
problem with equivalence of mixed strategies only arises if two consecutive player 
i information sets are assigned to different agents. 
Let S be an extensive form structure and 7r a player splitting on S. We say 
that the solution <.p is invariant under 7r if for every extensive form game r with 
structure S, every game r' which is equivalent to r 7r and every surjective function 
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f which maps mixed strategies in S to perfectly equivalent collections of mixed 
strategies in S7r we have 
<p(r') = {J(S) IS E <p(r)} (5.1) 
and for every T E <p(r') it holds that 
u {S E <p(r) I f(S) = T } = f-l(T). (5.2) 
If the solution <p is a point valued solution, both conditions are equivalent to 
If it holds that 
{J(S) IS E <p(r)} c <p(r') 
we say that <p is weakly invariant under 1r. 
In the remainder of this paper, functions f with the properties listed above are 
called transformation functions. 
Relation with player splitting property 
We show that 'invariance under every independent player splitting' is equivalent 
to the player splitting property. In order to see this, consider an extensive form 
structure S and an independent player splitting 7r on S. Every completely mixed 
strategy Pi in S has only one equivalent collection of mixed strategies in S7r, 
namely f7r(Pi). Since the function f7r is continuous, it follows that for each mixed 
strategy Pi in S, r(Pi) is the only perfectly equivalent collection of mixed strate-
gies in S7r. Therefore, the only possible transformation function is the function 
f7r. By comparing the definitions of invariance under player splittings and the 
player splitting property, we obtain the following lemma. 
Lemma 5.1. A solution is invariant under every independent player splitting 
on every extensive form structure if and only if it satisfies the player splitting 
property. 
In view of the lemma above, invariance under player splittings is an extension of 
the player splitting property. In a similar way, we can show that the solution is 
weakly invariant under every independent player splitting on every extensive form 
structure if and only if the solution satisfies the weak player splitting property. 
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6. Behavior of solutions under dependent player splittings 
We show that none of the solution concepts considered above is invariant under 
any dependent player splitting. 
N ash equilibria 
Lemma 6.1. The Nash equilibrium concept is not invariant under any dependent 
player splitting. 
Proof. Let 5 be an extensive form structure and 7r a dependent player splitting 
on 5. Then there are two different agents ij and ik in 5 7r which appear both in 
a certain play of the game. Formally, this means that we can find a path from 
the root to Z containing two nodes, say x E h and x' E h', controlled by agents 
ij and ik respectively. Let a be the unique action on this path leaving x. Since 
IA(h)1 2:: 2, we can find another action, say b at x. Next, choose two different 
actions a' and b' at x'. 
h' Z' 1 
h a' 
b' 
b o 
o 
Figure 4 
Note that the line from the root to x does not represent one single action. This 
line covers all the actions and chance moves that are present on the path to x. 
The same holds for the line ending at x' and the lines ending at terminal nodes. 
By Z' we denote the set of terminal nodes which follow the action a'. Let the 
payoff function u be given by 
1 if j = i and Z E Z' 
o otherwise 
and let r be the game (5, u). Choose a pure strategy profile m in r 7r such that 
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(1) rn chooses all the actions on the path from the root to x', except a and 
(2) rn chooses the actions band b'. 
Then rn is a Nash equilibrium for the game f7f which gives player i payoff O. 
Let f be an arbitrary transformation function. It can be checked easily that 
f-l(rn) = {rn}. However, rn is not a Nash equilibrium in f since player i can 
strictly increase his payoff by deviating unilaterally to a pure strategy selecting 
the actions a and a'. Consequently, the Nash equilibrium correspondence is not 
invariant under 7r. 0 
The other solution concepts 
We show that perfect equilibria, proper equilibria, KM-stable sets and M-stable 
sets are not weakly invariant under any dependent player splitting. In order to 
prove these results, we use one and the same counterexample. 
Lemma 6.2. Perfect equilibria, proper equilibria, KM-stable sets and M-stable 
sets are not weakly invariant under any dependent player splitting. 
Proof. Let S be an extensive form structure and 7r a dependent player splitting 
on S. Then we can choose h,h',x,x',a,b,a',b' as in Lemma 6.1. 
h' 1 
h 
a 
b .-----------.Z' 0 
1 
Figure 5 
By Z' we denote the set of those terminal nodes following the action b'. Let the 
payoff function u be given by 
{ 
0 if j = i and Z E Z' Uj(z) := 1 
otherwise, 
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and let f = (5, u). Choose a pure strategy profile m such that 
(1) all the actions on the path to x', except a, are chosen and 
(2) the actions band b' are chosen. 
We show that m is a strictly perfect equilibrium in f. As a consequence, m is 
perfect and the set {m} is a KM-stable set since every single point set consisting 
of a strictly perfect equilibrium is a KM-stable set. Moreover, it can be shown 
that {m} is a M-stable set in r. Since a M-stable set always contains a proper 
equilibrium, it follows that m is proper in f. 
Secondly, we prove that for every transformation function j, j(m) is not a perfect 
equilibrium in pr. Consequently, j(m) is not proper in f7r and the set j({m}) is 
not a KM-stable set and not a M-stable set in f7r since KM- and M-stable sets 
consist solely of perfect equilibria. 
Combining all the insights above leads to the conclusion that perfect equilibria, 
proper equilibria, KM-stable sets and M-stable sets are not weakly invariant under 
Jr. 
First, we prove that m is strictly perfect in f. However, this follows easily from 
the fact that player i's strategy in m is a best response against any strategy 
profile in f. Since the other players always receive 1 the stategy profile m is 
strictly perfect. 
Now, let j be a corresponding transformation function. Then, j(m) = m. Let 
ik be the agent controlling information set hi. The pure strategy mik played by 
agent ik in m is weakly dominated by the pure strategy mik \a
' 
in f7r. Therefore, 
m is not a perfect equilibrium in f7r. 0 
7. Characterization of independent player splittings and single ap-
pearance structures 
By combining the results of section 4 and 6, we obtain the following characteri-
zations of the class of independent player splittings. 
Theorem 7.1. The class of independent player splittings is the largest class of 
player splittings under which 
(a) the Nash equilibria, perfect equilibria, KM-stable sets and M-stable sets are 
invariant and 
(b) the proper equilibria are weakly invariant. 
By largest, we mean largest with respect to set inclusion. 
Next, we consider a special class of extensive form structures which we call single 
appearance structures. An extensive form structure is called a single appearance 
structure if every path in the game tree crosses at most one information set of 
every player. In other words, each player appears at most one single time in 
every play of the game. Obviously, the class of single appearance structures can 
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be characterized by stating that it is the largest class of structures for which every 
player splitting is independent. 
Using the theorem above, we can give the following characterizations of the class 
of single appearance structures in terms of invariance of solution concepts under 
player splittings. 
Theorem 7.2. The class of single appearance structures is the largest class of 
extensive form structures S for which 
(a) the Nash equilibria, perfect equilibria, KM-stable sets and M-stable sets are 
invariant under every player splitting on Sand 
(b) the proper equilibria are weakly invariant under every player splitting on S. 
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